A framework for thinking about enterprise formalization policies in developing countries by Kenyon, Thomas
A Framework for Thinking about Enterprise 








What policies encourage firms to become ‘formal’? The standard approach emphasizes reducing 
the costs of compliance with government regulation. This is unlikely to be sufficient. Instead we 
need to understand compliance as a function not only of firm-level costs and benefits but also in 
terms of the interaction between the firm and its competitors and between the firm and the state. 
This paper emphasizes the coordination and credibility issues involved in promoting 
formalization and discusses possible institutional solutions, among them business associations 
that make the benefits of membership dependent on compliance, information sharing 
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dFormalization: Concepts and Questions 
 
How do firms become ‘formal’? What, if anything, can or should policy-makers do to 
encourage them? These are important questions. The best estimates we have suggest that 
over 30 percent of output and 70 percent of workers in developing countries are to some 
degree outside the scope of government regulation. Most people also agree that the 
proportion is rising over time. Where there is less agreement is over what to do about it. 
Nobody would argue that the state should turn a blind eye to criminal activity. But there 
is debate over whether it makes sense to formalize other forms of extra-regulatory 
activity – those that would be legal if not conducted outside the state’s purview. Some 
have argued that informality is a rational response to inefficient regulation and that 
informal firms in developing countries should be regarded as analogous to the voluntary 
small enterprise sector in developed economies. Others have emphasized the externalities 
associated with regulatory evasion and the possible untoward effects of informality on 
growth and productivity. 
 
This paper is concerned less with the causes and consequences of informality than with 
how the process of formalization occurs in practice. It takes as its starting point the 
assumption that where the potential for a voluntary accommodation between private 
enterprise and the state exists, it should be encouraged. The questions it addresses are 
why such accommodation might be difficult to achieve and how best to bring it about. Its 
objective is to provide a framework for thinking about the process of formalization that 
goes beyond the customary emphasis on regulatory simplification and addresses the 
collective action problems involved in building a culture of compliance between 
entrepreneurs and states in developing countries. Experience tells us self-interest alone is 
not always enough to ensure cooperation. At root, the task is one of creating a social 
contract between entrepreneurs and state. This does not happen overnight, but neither is it 
immutable. The purpose of paper is to delineate some of the factors that might make it 
possible and to throw out some conjectures for further empirical investigation. 
 
 
What do ‘formal’ and ‘formalization’ mean? 
 
In its original use, ‘informal’ activities were distinguished from ‘formal’ ones by their 
degree of rationalization, or embodiment of impersonal principles of social organization 
(Hart, 2005, 7). Given the identification of organizational rationality with the ‘modern’ 
state, the term has come to apply to those economic activities not subject to its regulation 
and control. This identification of formal rationality with states is potentially misleading, 
given the highly personalized characteristics of states in some parts of the world and the 
bureaucratic nature of some non-state forms of social organization. Nonetheless the 
‘legal’ definition provides an adequate starting point. It is also helpful because it points to 
informality as a form of state failure. This can take several forms, according to whether 
the regulation in question concerns labor standards, taxation, product standards, land 
titles or some other form of government control. It is important to recognize the 
heterogeneity of the ‘informal sector’, encompassing as it does almost all sorts of 
activities, from the self-employed, to small businesses employing a handful of workers to, 
  2in some developing countries, quite large enterprises with several hundred employees. 
Some firms may be registered with one set of authorities but not another, for instance, or 
be registered but under-declare sales or workers for tax purposes.  
 
‘Formalization’ refers to the process whereby previously non-compliant enterprises 
become integrated into these formal or state-sanctioned institutions, such as property 
registries and tax-rolls. We know relatively little about how this occurs in practice. Public 
policy may have a role to play, but the process need not necessarily take place under state 
sponsorship. The experience of some developed countries, Italy in particular, suggests 
that inducing regulatory compliance requires a combination of self-interest on the part of 
entrepreneurs, government intervention and ongoing self-monitoring (Locke and 
Criscuolo, 2006). The particular mix of public intervention and private initiative is also 
likely to vary from country to country and by type of enterprise. Since our concern is to 
encourage the growth of markets for products, finance and skills, most of the examples in 
this paper are drawn from cases of tax and product market formalization. But the 
mechanisms that promote compliance in these areas are similar to those for other forms 
of upgrading. 
 
In thinking about formalization, we should acknowledge that formal or state-sanctioned 
institutions are more likely to succeed when they build on existing informal arrangements. 
The term ‘accommodation’ implies compromise on both sides. There must a commitment 
to compliance on the part of entrepreneurs. But ‘bureaucratic institutions [also] need to be 
more flexible in their treatment of informal practices, so that more people can take shelter 
under the rule of law’ (Hart, 2006, 13). This can involve adapting orthodox institutions 
for unorthodox ends – as in Ghana, where the road transport workers’ union (GPRTU) 
has collected taxes on behalf of the state since the late 1980s and has the authority to 
enforce safety standards among its members (Joshi and Ayee, 2002); or  Kenya and 





When is formalization appropriate? 
 
We begin from the assumption that in so far as there is scope for a voluntary 
accommodation between informal enterprises and the state in developing countries, it 
should be encouraged. How large is the potential for such a bargain? The short answer is 
that we have no comprehensive data. But an IFC survey of Sierra Leone, for example, 
found that 80 percent of informal entrepreneurs would consider formalizing over the 
coming year. Another study of informal firms in South Africa found that only 24 percent 
thought their ‘present level of compliance was sufficient, or saw no disadvantage in 
informal status’ (SBP, 2005, 14). No doubt some informal enterprises would disappear if 
forced to comply with government regulation and it may well be that from some points of 
view integration into state-sponsored institutions does not make sense. But the potential 
for voluntary formalization would also appear to be large. 
                                                 
1 Interview with Vandana Chandra, Senior Economist, Economic Policy and Debt Unit, Poverty Reduction 
Economic Management Network, World Bank. 
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For whom does formalization make most sense? We are accustomed to thinking of the 
formalization decision in terms of costs and benefits to the firm. The former include 
registration and licensing fees and the ongoing costs of compliance with health and safety, 
social security and other labor regulations. Many informal enterprises evade taxation, 
though some are subject to inappropriate and sometimes arbitrary taxes and fees that 
cancel out the advantage of being outside the formal tax net. The benefits of formality to 
the firm are usually understood as including access to regulated markets for products, 
finance and training and to public institutions such as the courts and police. There is also 
some evidence that informal firms are more liable to extortion by government officials 
and more prone to suffer from crime. But these are not the only considerations. 
Informality carries social as well as private costs. A strong argument for formalization is 
that regulatory and tax evasion can be actively harmful, not only to workers and 
consumers but also to the formal firms that compete with them. Another is that large-
scale modern economic development depends on states and states cannot exist without a 
revenue base. This depends on their knowing the scope of economic activity within their 
borders, even if they refrain from taxing all of it. 
 
The table below breaks the informal ‘sector’ out into two types of participants (workers 
and enterprises) and two sets of motivations or explanations for remaining informal 
(evasion/competition vs. exclusion/irrelevance). It also adds a brief summary of the 
policy implications, which I elaborate on in more detail below. The rest of the paper is 
concerned with the lower two quadrants: enterprises that are wholly or partially 
unregulated – either because they are using evasion as a means of competitive advantage 
or because they see few benefits in belonging to the system. While the former is probably 
of higher priority, in the long run policy–makers should also consider taking steps to 
make formalization more attractive to all firms.  
 
Key distinctions: Workers vs. Enterprises & Evasion vs. Exclusion – Policy Implications 
 Evasion/Competition  Exclusion/Irrelevance 
Informal  workers  -  Mixed priority: provision of 
safety nets, enforcement of labor 
standards for the vulnerable; 





Informal enterprises  High priority: emphasis on 
enforcement (information 
sharing, tighter penalties, naming 





Medium priority: emphasis on 
provision of benefits & security 
(e.g. training, access to 
finance/product markets); link to 




  4High priority: The social benefits of formalization are arguably greatest when the 
persistence of informality as a means of competitive advantage threatens to undermine 
the implicit bargain between state and formal enterprises. A series of McKinsey studies in 
the late 1990s found strong evidence that non-compliant enterprises were using tax and 
regulatory evasion as a means of competing unfairly with more productive formal 
enterprises (Palmade, 2005). There is a common assumption that all forms of regulation 
require adjustment to meet the needs of informal enterprises. But ‘focusing on the 
difficulties small and informal firms face in meeting the costs of … standards distracts 
our attention from pursuing opportunities to rise to the occasion and meet these standards, 
rather than be exempt from them’ (Tendler, 2002, 6). The most encouraging stories are 
those in which informal firms have overcome the obstacles to participation in formal 
markets – often under the threat of more stringent enforcement. 
 
Low priority: Some have argued that informality is a natural state for very small 
enterprises and that the costs of exclusion only become apparent once the firm reaches a 
certain size. This is particularly relevant in many low income countries, where the 
predominant form of employment is self-employment. Examples include the very poor or 
seasonal workers who engage in income-generating activity as and when circumstances 
require (Citron, 2004, 114), or those engaged in subsistence agriculture. Some 
commentators have gone even further and argued that extra-legality is an appropriate and 
workable strategy; others have argued that what matters is improving the livelihoods of 
workers in the informal economy, not encouraging formalization (USAID, 2005, 22). 
Maloney makes a useful distinction between informal workers and those employed in 
micro-enterprises, whom he argues should be tolerated as akin to the voluntary small 
business sector in developed countries, and larger enterprises that are either wholly or 
partially outside the regulatory system (Maloney, 2006, 9). 
 
 
Explaining Formalization: Beyond ‘Carrots’ and ‘Sticks’ 
 
We take the ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ approach as our starting point. It is commonly accepted 
that there are costs and benefits of participating in societal institutions. The remedy 
derived from this diagnosis is straightforward: to alter the calculus of costs and benefits 
by amending the legal regime to suit reality. This means simplifying business registration 
requirements; it may also involve creating appropriate legal categories for enterprises that 
do not fit into the existing framework. On the tax side, it may require a combination of 
simplified and more predictable tax regime and more effective enforcement (Engelschalk, 
2005, 27). More generally, tackling regulatory evasion requires governments to pay more 
attention to detection and enforcement – on which they typically spend far less than their 
counterparts in developed countries. This analysis is largely uncontroversial. It is a 
commonplace that compliance depends on firms’ perceiving that it is in their self-interest. 
And there is a large empirical literature, some of it based on survey evidence, that the 
more individuals and firms perceive that they are receiving quality public services, the 
more willing they are to pay taxes.
2 But the required blend between ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ 
is likely to vary substantially from case to case. Among other things, we should expect it 
                                                 
2 See Hanousek and Palda, 2004, for an overview and discussion of the situation in transition economies. 
  5to depend on the nature of relations between the state and informal private sector. Where 
firms are registered but not paying taxes, for instance, it may be appropriate to 
concentrate more on enforcement and information-sharing. Where enterprises are wholly 
outside the system, the inducements may need to be more positive, as we discuss in more 
detail below. First, though, why might such an arrangement be difficult to arrive at? 
 
Informality as a strategic problem 
 
Coordination: One reason is that, like many other social situations, the formalization 
decision is strategic – it depends on the decisions of others. It probably does not make 
sense for an entrepreneur to incur the costs of compliance with government regulation 
unless he or she can be sure that his or her competitors do the same. The underlying 
problem is a lack of coordination: Why pay taxes, register or comply with costly health 
and safety standards when nobody else does? Not only are you unlikely to receive any 
public services in return, you also place yourself at a severe competitive disadvantage. 
The result is that informal firms have little incentive to formalize and formal ones are 
deterred from investing and expanding – with potentially serious consequences for 
growth in output and productivity. 
 
Credibility: But there is another dimension to the problem. Not only does individual 
compliance depend on other entrepreneurs’ behavior; it also depends on the government 
upholding its side of the bargain. Once registered, it is harder for enterprises to evade 
predatory as well as legitimate interventions by the state. It is quite common for national 
governments to declare themselves in favor of ‘promoting the informal sector’ at the 
same time as municipal authorities harass informal entrepreneurs and destroy their 
equipment and premises. It is also common for officials to backtrack on a commitment – 
as in Morocco, where the local government in Marrakech first guaranteed street vendors a 
reduced tax rate if they registered their businesses and then once they had done so 
charged them four times the promised amount and required them to pay back taxes for 
the past five years (Citron, 2004, 110). Persuading informal enterprises to formalize 
requires governments to commit credibly against this sort of behavior. 
 
Information: Lastly, successful cooperation requires information about the benefits of 
participation. This may seem obvious but it is surprising how many government 
programs in developing countries fail to communicate with their intended beneficiaries. 
According to the IFC survey of informal firms in Sierra Leone, lack of information is the 
single most important deterrent to acquiring a business license – ahead of costs and 
inconvenience (FIAS, 2006, 40). A 2001 Tanzanian government tax simplification 
program failed because, crucially, the authorities did not inform entrepreneurs about the 
change (USAID, 2005, 31). And a study of the informal sector in Kenya concluded that 
‘only a tiny fraction of the jua kali [informal sector workers] know anything about the 
myriad schemes and projects designed to assist them’ (King, 1996, 191). 
 
The relative prevalence of these obstacles to formalization is likely to vary according by 
economic environment and firm type, as the table below shows. Coordination is likely to 
be more of a problem when informal enterprises compete directly with formal ones or 
  6when semi-formal firms employ regulatory evasion as a source of competitive advantage. 
This may be a more prominent issue in middle-income countries such as Brazil, Russia 
and Turkey than it is in most of Africa. Meanwhile credibility and vulnerability to 
predation are likely to be more salient for smaller enterprises such as owner-operated 
businesses that are wholly outside the system. A preliminary canvassing of opinion 
among policy-makers suggests the threat of extortion is among the most important 
deterrents to formalization in African countries. And the problem is not limited to 
corruption among officials: in mining communities, for instance, registering a business 
immediately exposes an entrepreneur to theft and violence on the part of his or her peers. 
  
Summary of Obstacles and Possible Solutions 
Problem  Typical Environment  Typical Firm  Solution 
Information  Lower income countries 
or regions (most of 
Africa) 
 
Small enterprises, owner 
operators 
Information campaigns, 
mechanisms for public 







Coordination Middle  income 
countries or regions (e.g. 
southern Brazil, eastern 
Europe) 
Larger firms in 
oligopolistic industries 
Business/other 
associations that make 






Credibility & trust  Lower income countries 





Small enterprises, owner 
operators 
Link to public sector 
reform, mechanisms for 
confidence building – 
explicit connection of 
benefits, initial emphasis 





Approaches to a Solution 
 
This description of the formalization decision as strategic interaction will be familiar to 
some readers. The players are formal firms, informal firms and government officials 
charged with implementing the rules (who are not necessarily the same people as make 
the rules). The preferable outcome is one in which both formal and informal firms 
comply with government regulations and in which government officials enforce the rules 
consistently and fairly. Unfortunately such a situation may be hard to achieve: the reason 
being that both informal enterprises and some government officials can gain by failing to 
cooperate. Informal enterprises benefit from evading regulations and taxes while their 
formal competitors comply. In the meantime government officials can profit from 
running a protection racket in which they threaten to disrupt or evict informal 
  7entrepreneurs and then relent on the payment of bribes or promise of some other form of 
support, such as votes.
3 Overcoming these difficulties requires a careful approach. 
Unfortunately governments sometimes worsen the problem by adding to the tax and 
regulatory burden on formal firms to compensate for poor enforcement. This simply 
drives more firms underground. Moreover, policy-makers need to recognize that simply 
closing down informal firms will throw many unskilled and poorly paid employees out of 
work, most of them beyond the reach of social safety nets. What are needed are 
institutional mechanisms to communicate the benefits of formalization to firms and to 
make both the benefits of compliance and the costs of non-compliance credible. 
 
Here it may be useful to think of the potential bargain between states and enterprises as 
analogous to that between private actors. The problem is similar: how to encourage the 
development of a hierarchical rules-based system of contracting. Most business in 
African countries is conducted on the basis of small networks of entrepreneurs from 
similar ethnic backgrounds. The key to these networks’ functioning is trust among 
individuals, developed on the basis of repeated personal interaction. What these 
mechanisms have in common is that they reduce the transactions costs associated with 
doing business. But relations-based systems are necessarily restricted in scope. As one 
scholar has put it, ‘difficulties in contracting make African markets look resemble the flea 
markets and garage sales of developed countries’ (Frazer, 2005, 322). They thus have 
much more in common with what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz termed the ‘bazaar-
type’ than the hierarchically organized ‘firm-type’ economies characteristic of developed 
countries (Geertz, 1963). The distinction between relations-based and rules-based 
systems is not altogether clear-cut: all developed economies, even the United States, rely 
to some degree on informal and personalized networks. But the analogy is useful in that 
the same arrangements that promote this transition among private entrepreneurs might 




Practical Elements of a Solution 
 
The social science literature contains a number of recommendations for solving these 
sorts of games. Among the most important are those that increase the benefits of 
cooperation, the costs of non-cooperation and the likelihood of detecting and sanctioning 
non-cooperative behavior. In what follows we focus on four such mechanisms: 
complementary government interventions that link the compliance decision to access to 
markets for finance and skills; private business associations that include formalizing 
firms and exclude non-compliant ones; coordination across government agencies to 
improve monitoring and enforcement; and measures that limit the scope for predatory 
behavior among government officials. Our focus is based on a preliminary review of the 




                                                 
3 See Tendler (2002) for an entertaining description of this process. 
  8Understanding and linking incentives 
  
For the most part the policy discourse has focused on changes to the legal environment in 
which informal firms operate. But measures to reduce the costs of entry are unlikely to be 
sufficient in the absence of positive incentives or ‘carrots.’ Common sense suggests that 
linking these changes to access to other resources, such as training, finance and the 
provision of physical infrastructure may be even more effective. But the benefits of 
formalization are generally quite specific to each particular activity. In mining 
communities, for example, small scale artisans don’t usually require loans but they do 
require a reliable means of holding and transporting cash. Linking formalization to credit 
would make little sense but providing physical security might.
4 Small scale service 
providers, such as suppliers of electricity, sanitation and water, need a stable legal 
environment because they have to make fixed investments that can be easily expropriated. 
Their overriding concern is not infrastructure or accreditation for their products, but the 
legitimacy that comes with regular status. 
 
What, if any, is the relationship among the different aspects of formalization? 
Formalization is a multi-faceted process and the linkages vary from country to country. In 
some middle income countries, for example, it may be necessary to obtain an external 
audit in order to tap certain forms of finance, particularly equity market. This can deter 
firms that are hiding activities from the tax authorities from seeking a public listing 
(Kenyon, 2006). In lower income countries on the other hand, there is typically no 
interface or information sharing between credit or land titling registries and the tax 
authorities. Nor is there necessarily any connection between product market upgrading 
and some other aspects of formalization. Moroccan firms wishing to participate in 
government sponsored export programs need to be registered, certainly, but they would 
not necessarily need to undergo an audit and might well continue to under-declare sales 
and workers to the tax authorities.
5 The evidence linking legal formalization to 
participation in markets is weak. A study of the impact of Peru’s administrative law 
reform, for instance, found that its benefits had fallen well short of what was promised.
6  
 
Policymakers are often cautious about linking market access to registration or other 
bureaucratic requirements. They feel that markets should be open to all irrespective of 
status. And development practitioners, especially those in micro-finance, may be wary of 
linking formalization to access for finance for fear of undermining their business. There 
are also many cases in which such attempts have failed. In the late 1990s the South 
African government established education and training authorities to encourage SME 
development. The results have been inadequate for several reasons. Several authorities 
argued that they should prioritize the needs of formal firms since they were the ones 
paying the levies. Also many training providers regarded informal employees as un-
trainable because of their low literacy levels. Meanwhile, high levels of crime meant that 
                                                 
4 Interview with Lucie Philips, President, IBI. 
5 Interview with Yasser Charafi, Projects Officer, IFC, Rabat, Morocco. 
6 Of the 512,000 families that received land titles between 1996 and 2000, for example, only about one 
percent had obtained a mortgage from a bank – which had been the original rationale for reform 
(Winterberg, 2005, 4). 
  9trainers were often unwilling to enter the areas in which potential trainees lived and 
worked (Lund and Skinner, 2005, 14). The one success story has been the baked goods 
sector, where the private suppliers of fixed capital equipment – i.e. ovens - provided both 
management training and credit together and had a strong financial incentive to ensure 
that their clients had adequate book-keeping and managerial skills.
7
 
Nonetheless, it is worth thinking creatively about how to connect the costs and benefits of 
compliance – otherwise the incentive to regularize will disappear. There are various ways 
of doing it. In one case the government worked with commercial banks to persuade them 
to lower their cost of lending to enterprises that had committed to formalization. In 
another, a revenue authority allowed newly registered firms to charge higher VAT rates 
on their products than those they paid to their suppliers – effectively giving them a tax 
break. One approach might be to use pooled data on registered enterprises to make it 
easier for individuals to get access to, for example, health insurance or other services. 
And another possible intervention concerns physical infrastructure. The South African 
city of Johannesburg sought to formalize a cluster of enterprises in the garment sector 
into the formal economy by providing them with storage and office space in a specially 
designated ‘fashion district.’ It also gave them training and advice on marketing and 
business development. A controlled comparison later found that these interventions led 
not only to higher levels of output and employment, but also to product diversification 
and competitive upgrading (Rogerson, 2004, 422). 
 
 
Working through intermediaries 
 
The second lesson to emerge from our experience is that it is almost impossible to 
formalize unorganized informal sector enterprises. The best approach is to work through 
existing informal organizations. Ideally, governments should to identify ‘amphibians’ – 
those individuals or associations with one foot in the informal and the other in the formal 
sector. The advantage of working through intermediaries is that they are generally more 
credible than governments, have closer knowledge of conditions on the ground and may 
be better placed to enforce bargains – providing selective benefits to those who choose to 
formalize. They are also well qualified to set common industry standards and identify and 
punish individuals who fail to meet them – a very important consideration in export 
clusters where even a single breach can undermine an industry’s reputation. Finally 
informal sector organizations are also in a position to package information about their 
members and provide it to commercial banks or other service providers at a lower cost 
than if these outsiders did it for themselves. 
 
The usual candidates for this intermediating function are business associations. Formal 
private sector associations can persuade entrepreneurs to formalize by making the 
benefits of membership contingent on regulatory compliance. The usefulness of business 
associations as instruments for economic development varies widely. In some cases, they 
have contributed to innovation and upgrading and, at times, to the formalization of 
                                                 
7 Interview with Vandana Chandra, Senior Economist, Economic Policy and Debt Unit, Poverty Reduction 
Economic Management Network, World Bank. 
  10informal firms. In northern Italy, for example, producer groups offered technical 
assistance and administrative support to help businesses comply with tax rules. These 
services were also bundled with access to finance and product market certification, which 
meant that firms had a strong incentive to participate. Over time, this led to the 
generation of a ‘compliance culture’ and the graduation of large parts of Italian industry 
to the formal economy (Criscuolo, 2003). In Kenya the association of small tea-growers 
helped its members’ compliance with national product standards by acquiring inputs, 
such as pesticides and fertilizers, in bulk and selling them at a discount to producers.
8 
Business associations in the Moroccan textile industry have played a similar role with 
respect to equipment and machinery.
9 An association of handicrafts entrepreneurs in 
Madagascar has done the same with regard to tax compliance.
10  
 
Unfortunately, there are also many cases, particularly in Africa, in which business 
associations have acted in the manner predicted by public choice theorists – as lobbyists 
for a small number of influential firms. They tend to be dominated by large firms, often 
with close ties to political leaders – sometimes tripartite in form, though patronage-based. 
They also tend to concentrate on obtaining exemptions from existing policies, rather than 
participating in and influencing the development of new regulation.
11  Sometimes 
governments have actively discouraged independent associations. In Kenya the Moi 
government first encouraged the formation of ‘jua kali’ or informal sector groups but 
then backtracked out of fear that they might emerge as a political force to threaten its 
position (Cohen, 2004).  
 
Other potential partners include large formal firms – either individually or a part of an 
export processing zone (examples include Mittal Steel in Liberia and Mozal in 
Mozambique). But the role is not restricted to multinationals – domestic formal firms can 
be useful as well. In Senegal, locally-owned fish wholesalers selling to European markets 
have worked closely with informal suppliers to help them meet export standards – for 
instance, by providing them with ice so that their catch does not spoil en route to the 
processing plant and by issuing invoices on their behalf to keep track of production. The 
Senegalese experience shows the value of collaboration between formal and informal 
enterprises for securing market access via upgrading, but also illustrates its limits – 
especially in industries that require careful resource management. Meanwhile in countries 
where private sector activities have been disrupted by conflict it can be advantageous to 
work with enterprises that were previously formal and which retain a ‘memory’ of what it 
is like to operate within a regulated system. 
 
 
Improving detection and sanctions 
 
In addition to linking compliance to market access and working through intermediaries, 
policymakers need to consider improving enforcement – the commonly referred to ‘stick’. 
                                                 
8 Interview with Yasuo Konishi, Managing Director, Global Development Solutions. 
9 Interview with Melani Cammett, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brown University. 
10 Interview with Johane Rajaobelina. Operations Officer, International Finance Corporation, Madagascar. 
11 Interview with Adrienne Lebas, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University. 
  11Thus a third hypothesis concerns the need for coordination among different government 
agencies. Enforcing compliance requires sharing information, particularly the tax 
authorities, business registries, social security administration and health and safety 
authorities. This is necessary because regulatory and tax evasion are harder to track than 
many other types of crime. Many OECD countries, for example, have introduced laws 
allowing the transfer of information among social security administrations, social 
services, the revenue authorities and health insurers. Some, such as the UK, have also 
allowed information sharing between these government agencies and private banks, 
utilities and educational establishments in an effort to eradicate social security fraud. In 
Ireland individuals not registered with the tax authorities are identified ‘among other 
things by information on rent subsidy payments, purchases of property etc.’ (OECD, 
2004, 263). 
 
Most developing countries lack such information-sharing mechanisms. In Morocco, for 
example, companies receive different identification numbers from the social security 
ministry, tax authorities and company registrar – making it impossible to trace their 
activities. This might appear to be a relatively simple technical issue, requiring the 
installation of an automated common system but in practice it is complicated by inter-
agency rivalries and reluctance to cooperate.
12 Several countries have experimented by 
introducing ‘one-stop shops’ for business registration that enable government agencies to 
draw on a single database and that might, theoretically at least, help them to identify 
evaders. A proposed scheme for Costa Rica, for instance, would provide common 
registration information to the tax authorities, social security institute, ministry of health 
and municipal chambers of commerce (World Bank, 2006, 15). 
 
Since responsibility for implementation typically lies at the local level, effective 
policymaking also requires cooperation between across different levels of government. 
One of the emerging lessons from the South African experience is that ‘the support and 
environmental needs of formal and informal enterprises are much the same, but 
governance in the business environment and in local government can operate in such a 
way as to create bottlenecks and constraints for the majority of smaller and poorer 
workers.’
13  Meanwhile in Vietnam provincial authorities implemented a national 
Enterprise Law in such a way as to produce serious inconsistencies between its content 
and regulations on the ground (Kurz and Frode, 72, 2005) – with corresponding 
differences in the propensity of firms to register. A more positive example comes from 
Brazil, where the federal government established a National Antipiracy Council with 
members from seven government departments and private sector representatives. This 
has allowed more cooperation among the Federal Police, Internal Revenue and customs 
authorities and has led to several joint-policy operations. One result has been to cut 
smuggling along the Paraguayan border by 30 percent (Kenyon and Kapaz, 2005). 
 
 
Improving the quality of public management: 
 
                                                 
12 Interview with Najy Benhassine, Senior Private Sector Development Specialist, World Bank. 
13 Lund and Skinner, 2005, p. 3. 
  12A final set of solutions concerns the relationship between enterprise formalization and 
public sector management reform. Common sense suggests that formalization initiatives 
are more likely to succeed when accompanied by anti-corruption measures or at least by 
changes to business registration and other procedures that reduce opportunities for 
predation. It is often argued that simplifying regulatory procedures will in itself reduce 
corruption by limiting the opportunities for rent extraction. In the Ukraine, for instance, 
USAID claims that its BIZPRO reforms reduced corruption associated with business 
registration by 84 percent.
14 Unfortunately we have been unable to find much other direct 
evidence of the link between anti-corruption programs and registration or tax compliance. 
But this is not to say that additional measures – like providing outside guarantees of 






This paper has sketched out some of the obstacles involved in constructing a bargain 
between informal or partially formal entrepreneurs and the state in developing countries, 
beyond the standard prescription of regulatory simplification, and hinted at possible 
institutional solutions. It emphasizes the strategic – as opposed to the individual level – 
element of the entrepreneur’s decision to regularize, focusing on the relationships 
between enterprise and public officials and among informal or formalizing enterprises. It 
also draws on the literature in political science to hint at some broad solutions, most of 
them involving intermediaries such as business or other informal sector associations. One 
of the points to emerge from our dialogue with policy-makers and representatives of 
informal sector associations in Africa is that is very difficult to formalize enterprises that 
are not already themselves organized in some fashion. My objective in doing so has been 
to convince the reader that the usual approach to enterprise formalization – regulatory 
simplification – may need to be complemented by other approaches and to point to the 
directions in which research and project work in this area might profitably be directed. 
Among the outstanding questions are: What is the appropriate balance between positive 
sanctions and enforcement and how might it change during the process of formalization? 
How might business associations and large firms be persuaded to cooperate with informal 
sector enterprises? And how should the policy approaches to informality discussed here 
be adapted to the differing needs of lower and middle-income countries or post-conflict 
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